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Introduction
Over the past decade of Labour government 
in the United Kingdom (U.K.), the regulation of 
sexual orientation through law has frequently 
been explained by its supporters through a nar-
rative of progress and even emancipation. "e 
most recent junction in this journey came in 
2007, with the coming into force of the Equality 
Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations on 30 April 
2007.1 "ese Regulations contain measures pro-
hibiting discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation in the provision of goods, facilities 
and services, education, the use and disposal of 
premises, and the exercise of public functions.2
"e Regulations must be set within the wider 
context of the still fairly new Equality Act 2006,3 
which created the Commission for Equality and 
Human Rights (the enforcement body for the 
Act), and which replaces the piecemeal system 
of equality rights protection previously found 
in the Equal Opportunities Commission, the 
Commission for Racial Equality, and the Dis-
ability Rights Commission. "e Equality Act 
2006 outlawed discrimination on the grounds 
of religion or belief, and imposed duties related 
to sexual discrimination on persons perform-
ing public functions, but le# for a later day the 
issue of sexual orientation discrimination in the 
provision of goods and services. 
Understood in this context, and given the 
fact that legal change addressing this issue came 
about by statutory instrument rather than pri-
mary legislation,4  the sexual orientation Regu-
lations might be interpreted as a mere tidying 
up exercise. However, this would be a misinter-
pretation of events. "e issue of sexual orienta-
tion was held over to be dealt with by second-
ary legislation, in part because of the perceived 
complexity and controversial nature of the issue 
and, perhaps, in the hope that extensive public 
debate and discussion would be avoided.5 Ulti-
mately, the Regulations were approved by Par-
liament in March 2007, and entered into e$ect 
on 30 April 2007.
Even before the Regulations were laid be-
fore Parliament, a storm of controversy erupted 
which raised wide-ranging concerns related to 
rights, sexuality, religion, beliefs, secularism, 
the limits of tolerance of minorities, as well as 
to how minorities are socially constructed. "is 
article focuses on parliamentary and print me-
dia representations of the issues at stake. Cen-
tral to the controversy was the future status of 
Catholic adoption agencies, which are subject 
to the Regulations in that they provide a service 
to prospective parents.6 "e widely discussed 
question was whether those agencies should be 
exempt from a duty to consider same-sex cou-
ples on an equal basis in the application of the 
“best interests of the child” test, in placing chil-
dren for adoption. 
"e issue assumed a symbolic importance 
far beyond its practical relevance. It was widely 
agreed that there were many avenues open to 
same-sex couples wishing to pursue adoption 
aside from the Catholic agencies and, intuitively, 
it seemed unlikely that many same-sex couples 
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would be adamant on pursuing adoption only 
through a Catholic agency. Nevertheless, same-
sex adoption came to stand for a larger princi-
ple concerning the extent to which faith-based 
groups, which receive public subsidy, could be 
exempted from anti-discrimination legislation 
when providing a public service. Conversely, the 
principle was expressed as concerning the ex-
tent to which the discourse of equality and gay 
rights trumped the sincerely held faith-based 
views of a minority, views which were being ex-
pressed through the provision of adoption ser-
vices. Not surprisingly, the adoption issue also 
fuelled well-worn discourses around the best 
interests of children, same-sex parenting, and 
the heterosexual family as the “gold standard” 
in the raising of children.7 
Constructing the Minority Group
Opposition to the sexual orientation Regu-
lations was articulated through a mixture of old 
and new tropes. While my particular interest in 
this article is the new discourses around secu-
larism and the rights of religious minorities to 
exist in a secular society — a characterization 
which I want to problematize — there is still 
plenty of space for longstanding old arguments 
which centre on children. Not only do these 
discourses focus upon the way in which the 
best interests test should be applied, but also on 
other claims familiar to those who have studied 
anti-gay rhetoric.8 For example, much attention 
was paid to the family run bed-and-breakfast 
establishment, and the alleged right of propri-
etors to turn away same-sex couples because the 
proprietors’ faith would not allow them to cre-
ate opportunities for those couples to engage in 
sodomy within the family home (a home which, 
of course, had been turned into a commercial 
operation).9 "is example allowed both sides to 
demonstrate the manipulability of the binaries 
of public/private, commercial/residential, and 
home/work, in support of their arguments. It 
also gave rise to interesting references to the 
act/identity distinction related to sexual orien-
tation. Couples would be turned away, not be-
cause of who they are, but because of what they 
would potentially do (on the assumption that 
the act of doing sodomy is an inevitable result of 
being given an opportunity to practice it).10 "e 
language of child protection also &gured prom-
inently in this example, appearing in claims de-
fending children in hypothetical families from 
the in&ltration of homosexuals into the family 
home. Such language resonates with very old 
tropes concerning pollution and infection.11
In both political and media debate, consid-
erable time was also given over to schools. Bar-
oness O’Cathain, for example, recounted that: 
a pro-gay group . . . is already going around 
the country telling schools that the regulations 
mean they have to normalise homosexuality 
to seven-year-olds and read gay fairy tales in 
the classroom.12 
Here, the longstanding trope concerning the 
promotion of homosexuality through educa-
tion reappears; this trope has a pedigree dating 
back to the now repealed section 28 of the Local 
Government Act,13 which prohibited the promo-
tion of homosexuality by local authorities as a 
“pretended family relationship.”14 Opponents 
of the Regulations feared that the letter of the 
law, as well as the “climate of fear”15 created by 
the Regulations, would force schools, including 
faith-based schools, to promote homosexuality 
through gay sex education classes. In this way, 
faith-based schools would be prevented from 
promoting sexual monogamy through the in-
stitution of marriage. 
However, there was also a new focus in pop-
ular and parliamentary debate, which turned 
on faith-based, conscientious objectors to ho-
mosexuality — those who provide goods and 
services to the public. In this argument, the 
wedding photographer and the caterer become 
the o#-cited examples of those who might feel 
morally compelled to turn away lesbian or gay 
clients.16 "e objectors to homosexuality are 
consistently constructed as a minority group, 
and an increasingly oppressed minority, which 
will be forced to act against its genuinely and 
deeply held religious beliefs. In the process, the 
minority’s rights are trumped (and trampled 
upon) in the service of the rights of “well or-
ganised and intolerant lobbies,”17 who have the 
backing of political elites. While supporters of 
the sexual orientation Regulations describe the 
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law as achieving a balance among con(icting 
rights; for opponents, the law does precisely the 
opposite — it throws the relationship between 
equality and freedom of religion out of balance, 
and does so in such a way as to counter the 
historic Englishness of protections for liberty, 
speech, and the freedom of groups to practice 
their beliefs. As one opponent of the Regula-
tions puts the point: “It is a development en-
tirely at variance with our well rooted tradition 
of religious tolerance and liberty.”18 In this way, 
the law ignores the interests of an increasingly 
persecuted minority and puts innocent, morally 
upstanding individuals in fear of prosecution.19 
"us, “religions are now seen not primarily as 
bene&ciaries of rights of protection from the 
state, as subjects enjoying religious freedom, but 
as potential sources of human rights breaches. 
Religion is a problem.”20
!e Silenced Majority
At the same time, critics of the Regulations 
suggest that the law has also ignored the voices 
of the (silenced) majority, which occupy the 
genuine “middle ground” of politics. "e sexual 
orientation Regulations are “a weapon promot-
ing discrimination against both majority and 
minority religious faiths,”21 which have been 
marginalized by the actions of political elites 
seeking to &nd favour with a well organized, 
articulate, and powerful lesbian and gay con-
stituency. "is middle ground is constructed 
through “common sense,” but common sense 
which also includes the practice of disclaiming 
homophobia.22 "at is, opponents of progres-
sive gay rights legislation increasingly make 
clear — and this has always been true to some 
extent — that they are not homophobic. Indeed, 
many commentators and politicians go further 
and are at pains to point out that they have sup-
ported gay rights in the past, but that this is a 
step too far.23 While these critics proclaim their 
support for anti-discrimination legislation in 
employment, possibly even for civil partnership 
legislation (probably because it is not marriage 
in name), and occasionally even support anti-
discrimination legislation with respect to goods 
and services in general, the moral or common 
sense objection to gay rights should also be re-
spected and protected. Scepticism regarding the 
value of same-sex adoption provides one such 
example of common sense which is self-evi-
dently true, but which has been silenced by the 
totalitarianism of gay rights.24 "us, critics seek 
to defend both the rights of a minority, as well 
as the views of the majority. "ey can also por-
tray themselves as defenders of the faith, and 
all faiths, by pointing to both the established 
Church and to the country’s Christian heritage 
(which is being eroded by the government), as 
well as to the importance of a multifaith, mul-
ticultural society. Finally, critics are the defend-
ers of the best interests of children who are 
otherwise sacri&ced to a political correctness, 
which protects the rights of lesbians and gays as 
consumers of adoption services. 
In response, proponents of the Regulations 
rely heavily on the rhetoric of equality rights, 
fairness, and balance: “the measures we have 
brought forward protect the rights of individu-
als and organisations to hold religious beliefs 
while also ensuring that everyone lives a life 
free from harmful discrimination.”25 Analogies 
are drawn between sexual orientation, race, and 
gender, all of which are deserving of the same 
level of legal protection: “I start from a very &rm 
foundation: there is no place in our society for 
discrimination.”26 "e need for compliance with 
international obligations is also mentioned.27 
"e discourse of child welfare, moreover, is 
countered on its own discursive terrain. Argu-
ments are made that the Regulations will pro-
tect gay youth from bullying in schools, protect 
children of gay parents from discrimination in 
education, and could ensure that children, who 
would otherwise not be adopted, will &nd lov-
ing homes with same-sex couples (although 
the gold standard of heterosexual parenting re-
mains largely untroubled in these arguments). 
Many supporters of the Regulations also bolster 
their positions by proclaiming their own Chris-
tian faith, which is articulated through compet-
ing, progressive principles of tolerance, fairness, 
and social justice.28
But this discursive battle becomes abstract-
ed to a further degree in the debates, as it is in-
creasingly reformulated in terms of a struggle 
between secularism and faith. Opponents cas-
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tigate the Regulations as yet further evidence 
of a secular ideology, which has become the 
dominant and guiding principle of the Labour 
government and, indeed, of political elites more 
generally. In this narrative, it is rights dis-
course, and speci&cally the Human Rights Act 
1998,29 which is central to the undermining of 
freedom and pluralism, and which has created a 
literal perversion of “right reason.” "rough the 
protection of human rights, a secular society is 
being forced upon the population; this secular 
society is one in which religion is relegated to 
a narrow private sphere, closeted from public 
display. "e Regulations do provide for excep-
tions for religious organizations. However, for 
their opponents, these exceptions only protect 
the narrow sphere of worship (that is, religious 
identity), rather than the “doing” of religion in 
the public realm (the practice). As Julian Rivers 
argues, “at best, this seems to create a category 
of ‘tolerated’ religion which may be permitted 
between consenting adults in private, but which 
ideally would be eradicated.”30 "erefore, in an 
unlikely twist, the distinction between act and 
identity — o#en deployed to regulate sexual 
identities and practices — now gets knowing-
ly reversed by opponents of the Regulations in 
defence of the right to practice religion.31 By 
contrast, proponents argue that the religious 
exceptions ensure that a balancing of rights is 
achieved, and the key distinction is the line be-
tween the religious and the commercial. Once 
that line is crossed, religious groups must act in 
a nondiscriminatory fashion. Moreover, faith-
based schools, it is argued, can continue to pro-
mote monogamous heterosexuality within the 
institution of marriage, while providing emo-
tional support to all children.32
Secularism as Fundamentalism
Despite the exceptions for religion in the 
Regulations, opponents remain adamant that 
secularism has become the dominant ideology 
and, indeed, they claim that it is the new reli-
gion of the political class, which has trampled 
over and silenced all others. In making this 
claim, ambiguity is apparent as to whether 
all religions have been unfairly treated, which 
is sometimes claimed, or whether, more spe-
ci&cally, it is the country’s Christian tradition 
which is under constant threat from the secu-
lar. At this point, there are interesting analogies 
that can be drawn with the way in which Chris-
tianity is constructed as under threat from mul-
ticulturalism. "e focus on Catholic adoption 
agencies, and the extent to which this issue re-
sulted in extensive joint lobbying of government 
by Catholic bishops and the Church of England 
hierarchy, underscores the extent to which the 
issue was seen as an attack on Christianity. "is 
is further supported by the way in which sec-
ularism has been constructed, not only as the 
new religion, but as a fundamentalist religion, 
in which thinly veiled comparisons are drawn 
to Islam.33 As Rivers warns: 
[I]t seems that a new moral establishment is 
developing, which is being imposed by law on 
dissenters. "ose &lling public o+ces are well 
advised to avoid challenging it, and even the 
most measured and reasoned public question-
ing of its truth can trigger formal investiga-
tions. "is new orthodoxy masks itself in the 
language of equality, thus refusing to discuss 
its premises and refusing to articulate its con-
ception of the good.34 
Even Catholics on the progressive le#, in 
defence of gay rights, resort to language that is 
not altogether dissimilar: “in the post-socialist 
age, non-faith based progressives are deadly se-
rious about imposing their liberalism.”35
In this regard, the debate provides a (avour 
of the way in which secularism is invoked in the 
U.K. as the sign of a contemporary ideological 
struggle. On this point, Judith Butler has re-
cently addressed how secularism is deployed in 
the admittedly very di$erent political culture 
of France to interrogate how it works to bolster 
anti-Islamic “progressive” politics.36 In doing 
so, she also makes the general argument that 
“secularism does not so much succeed religion 
sequentially, but reanimates religion as part of 
its ideas of culture and civilization.”37 I would 
argue that the controversy around the Regula-
tions could be interpreted in support of this the-
sis. Rather than the totalitarian imposition of a 
secular ideology upon a faith-based population 
— with the replacing of religion by a new faith 
(in liberal rights) — we &nd instead a “mix of 
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religious and secular ideals,”38 in which secular-
ism does not succeed religion but coexists, per-
haps uneasily, with it. 
Butler argues, and here she mirrors the views 
of many opponents of the Regulations, that “se-
curalism has a variety of forms, and many of 
them involve forms of absolutism and dogma-
tism that are surely as problematic as those that 
rely on religious dogma.”39 However, in the U.K. 
the evidence of the absolutism of secularism is 
far from compelling. Stewart Motha makes this 
very point in relation to the juxtaposition of lib-
eralism and the construction of Islamic funda-
mentalism, when he argues that “the repression 
of the religious as the condition of modern poli-
tics reveals itself to be the un&nished enterprise 
threatened by the eternal return of religion.”40 
Motha refers to a British culture which can 
claim to be both “secular in outlook” and, at 
the same time, “committed to Christian institu-
tions, political and juridical formations.”41
"ere is much evidence for Motha’s claim 
in the events surrounding the Regulations. A 
super&cial examination of the structure of the 
Regulations themselves reveals that faith is em-
bedded within the law in the form of exemp-
tions. Religious faith is taken to be synonymous 
with the integrity of belief, and serves to exempt 
the application of the law.42 While opponents 
may argue that the exemptions are drawn too 
narrowly, the relevant point is that they are 
drawn on the basis of religion rather than, for 
example, on the basis of sincerely held belief. 
Moreover, parliamentary debates are virtu-
ally devoid of any criticism of faith-based ho-
mophobic views.43 Instead, supporters of the 
Regulations argue that when religious groups 
o$er a service to the public, they have crossed 
a line (the religious/commercial, public/private 
binary) such that the application of the law is 
appropriate.44 But there is little discursive space 
for a critique of religion (especially of Christi-
anity), or for a discussion of the o$ensiveness 
of some religious doctrine.45 Furthermore, 
faith-based schools, which remain high on the 
government’s agenda, are still allowed to pro-
mote marriage and heterosexuality as the most 
desirable way of life.46 "e one notable excep-
tion to this uncritical acceptance of religion can 
be found in the speech of the openly gay and 
Muslim member of the House of Lords, Lord 
Alli, who makes clear that discriminatory views 
grounded in religious texts are unacceptable in 
a liberal democracy, and not just when religious 
actors enter the public, commercial sphere: 
When I read the Koran, it tells me in some pas-
sages that I must kill Jews. If I believe strongly 
enough that I must kill Jews, does that mean 
that I have the right to say, ‘Exempt me from 
legislation because I believe it strongly enough. 
Let me discriminate against Jews, at least, be-
cause I believe it strongly enough and it is writ-
ten in the Koran?’47
However, what further undermines the 
claim of the absolutism of secularism in the 
way in which it is deployed by opponents of the 
Regulations, is the place given to religious voic-
es in political debate in the U.K. "e Catholic 
Church and Church of England played promi-
nent roles around the same-sex adoption ques-
tion, facilitated by the membership of Church 
o+cials in the House of Lords, hardly a secu-
lar institution.48 But the political terrain was 
further complicated by the religious beliefs of 
prominent Labour politicians, and the way in 
which religion, particularly for politicians of 
the centre-le#, has been partially closeted from 
the public sphere. Most famously, Tony Blair’s 
admission of his deeply held religious beliefs 
and his conversion to Catholicism immediately 
a#er leaving o+ce, combined with his openly 
admitted fear of being labelled a “nutter” for his 
faith, underscore the complexities of religion for 
the Labour Party.49 "e then Secretary of State 
for Communities and Local Government, Ruth 
Kelly, is well known as a practising Catholic and 
member of the Opus Dei organization, and ru-
mour had it that she had di+culty supporting 
the Regulations, despite having responsibility 
for social cohesion and inclusion as part of her 
government portfolio.50 Even the Civil Partner-
ship Act 2004,51 although o#en described as a 
further sop to the lesbian and gay communities, 
prevents the forming of civil partnerships in 
religious buildings, and ensures that marriage 
is restricted to the union of one man and one 
woman.52
"e need for discretion that seems to be felt 
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by some British politicians — with respect to 
Roman Catholicism at least — could be seen as 
evidence that practising Christians have been 
forced into a sphere of privacy — even secre-
cy — by the dominance of secularism on the 
le#. Equally, however, the need for discretion 
might be the result of age-old stereotypes re-
garding Catholics, secret societies, and foreign 
allegiance to the Vatican. I would suggest that 
it indicates, at a minimum, a complex and con-
tested relationship between religions, but more 
crucially between Christianity and politics in 
Britain today, which is informed by the historic 
roles played by the established Church and Ro-
man Catholicism.53
Kate Nash has argued that human rights 
politics in the U.K. is best described in terms of 
a “communitarian rights culture,” in which the 
values of dialogue, compromise, and “the at-
tempt to reach and sustain agreement over con-
(ict and divergence in understandings of social 
relationships” is paramount.54 She &nds that the 
Civil Partnership Act exempli&es this culture, in 
which the divisive debates which have charac-
terized struggles over same-sex marriage have 
been largely absent from British political life. In 
my view, there is much merit to this position, 
but the sexual orientation Regulations demon-
strate the precariousness of such communitari-
an approaches to rights, as well the potential for 
rights struggles to produce polarized positions. 
Although the Regulations carve out religious ex-
emptions, and are characterized by proponents 
as a sensible, reasonable balancing of equality 
rights and religious freedom in a democratic so-
ciety, the language of balance and compromise 
always leaves open the possibility of further 
struggle over the proper balance of competing 
rights, and over the question of whether society 
has gone too far: “this legislation e$ects a rear-
rangement of discriminatory attitudes and bias 
to overcompensate and skew the &eld the other 
way.”55 In this moment, rights are constructed 
as a zero-sum game.56 "ey favour individual-
ism over “the rights of voluntary societies.”57 
Given that the Human Rights Act itself was a 
skilful attempt at balancing fundamental rights 
and the principle of parliamentary supremacy, 
leaving inevitable rights compromises to be re-
solved in the political realm, it is hardly surpris-
ing that British rights discourse has become a 
site of struggle, and that debates over human 
rights have been described as a quagmire.58 Fur-
thermore, it may be that the issue of same-sex 
adoption adds a particularly combustible fuel to 
the politics of rights because of the complex re-
lationship between children, parents, and sexu-
ality.59 In part, this is because it is far too easy to 
move from the rights of consumers of services 
to the right to possess and perhaps “consume” 
our children.60 Such arguments leave support-
ers of the Regulations to rely on their faith in 
the judicial application of the best interests test 
to ensure that children’s interests are adequately 
protected. 
Concluding !oughts
To conclude, the Critical Legal Studies move-
ment long ago taught us to be cautious about 
putting too much of our faith in rights.61 "e 
experience of rights struggles around sexuality 
over the past decade reveals that the language of 
rights lends itself to anti-gay arguments which 
not only deploy rights talk, but which can mirror 
the arguments advanced by progressive actors. 
"e debate over same-sex adoption highlights 
this point. Opponents of the sexual orientation 
Regulations can construct faith-based groups as 
disenfranchised, oppressed minorities which 
are increasingly forced to exercise discretion, 
and keep their beliefs in the private sphere, clos-
eted away from public view. According to them, 
the being of religion may be their right, but the 
doing of religion is subject to intense legal reg-
ulation by the state, undermining the core of 
their freedom. In this narrative, rights are being 
undermined by the secularist totalitarianism 
of the political elites and the fanatics of the les-
bian and gay movement. Simultaneously, rights 
discourse is deployed in the name of the com-
mon sense majority and on behalf of vulnerable 
children needing protection from rights seekers 
themselves.
However, the very fact that the Regulations 
have come into force may suggest cause for op-
timism, and the increasing marginalization of 
voices of opposition. On the other hand, the 
need felt by government to postpone applica-
tion of the Regulations to Catholic adoption 
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agencies until 31 December 2008, pending fur-
ther analysis of their potential impact, suggests 
that the supposed triumph of secularism is far 
from complete.
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